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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is a direct appeal as of right in a domestic relations proceeding in the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES. STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND PRESERVATION
I.

ARE THE TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ITS
CONCLUSION THAT THERE OCCURRED A SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH JUSTIFIES MODIFICATION?
The sufficiency of a trial court's findings of fact is a question of law which should be

reviewed for correctness. Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Wells v. Wells.
871 P.2d 1036 (Utah App. 1994). Preservation of the issue at trial is not applicable. State v.
Larsen. 999 P.2d 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 2000); ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson. 943 P.2d 247
(Utah. App. 1997).
H.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THAT A
SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES OCCURRED
WHICH JUSTIFIES MODIFICATION?
The trial court's findings should be overturned only if they are clearly erroneous, and only

where the trial court's judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
Thomas v. Thomas. 987 P.2d 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). However, if the findings are so
inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual determinations, the appellant
should be relieved of her burden to marshal the evidence. Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474,
477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Preservation of the issue at trial is not applicable. Larsen. 999 P.2d
1252 (Utah Ct. App. 2000); ProMax. 943 P.2d 247 (Utah. App. 1997).

m.

ARE THE TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS OF FACT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
ORDERREDUCINGMR. MONTAGUES ALIMONY OBLIGATION FROM $600.00
PER MONTH TO $150.00 PER MONTH?
The sufficiency of a trial court's findings of fact is a question of law which should be

reviewed for correctness. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct App. 1998); Wells, 871 P.2d 1036
(Utah App. 1994). Preservation of the issue at trial is not applicable. Larsen. 999 P.2d 1252
(Utah Ct. App. 2000); ProMax, 943 P.2d 247 (Utah. App. 1997).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. NATURE OF THE CASE.
This is an alimony modification case which arises as a result of Mr. Montague's cessation
of employment from his longtime employer, the LDS Church, and his corresponding obtainment
of new employment at a substantially lower wage than his historical earnings.
2. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
A decree of divorce between the parties was entered on or about December 5,1996. The
decree was the result of a negotiated settlement agreement between the parties, the terms of
which, inter alia, provided an award of alimony to Ms. Montague in the amount of $600.00 per
month. On October 14, 1998, after experiencing the loss of his long-term employment and a
significant reduction in income, Mr. Montague filed a Petition for Modification of Decree of
Divorce alleging a substantial and material change in circumstances occurred which warranted
downward modification of his alimony obligation. Trial on Mr. Montague's Petition was held on
January 5, 2000.
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3. DISPOSITION BELOW.
After taking evidence and testimony at the January 5, 2000 trial, the trial Court ordered
that Mr. Montague's alimony obligation to Ms. Montague be reduced from $600.00 per month
to $150.00 per month. No post-trial motions were filed. This appeal ensued.
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS.
At the time of entry of the Decree of Divorce Mr. Montague was employed full time with
the LDS Church (the Church) employment office as Supervisor of the Church's Granger
Employment Office, and earned a gross income of $3726.00 per month. (Exhibit 5, Addendum
2). He had been employed by the Church for over twenty years. (R. 10).
On June 26, 1998 Mr. Montague was placed on disciplinary probation, was demoted to
the position of employment specialist, and was transferred from the Granger Employment Center
to its Bountiful Employment office for reasons relating to poor work performance. (Exhibits 21,
22, Addendum 8, 9). Mr. Montague did not deny the allegations leading up to his disciplinary
probation, demotion and transfer. (Id.). Subsequent to his demotion and transfer, and while still
on disciplinary probation, issues concerning Mr. Montague's on-the-job conduct and work
performance persisted. (R. 99, Exhibit 1, Addendum 1).
Ultimately, on July 13, 1998, a meeting occurred between Mr. Montague and Church
human resources personnel, namely Ron Garrison and Dean Walker (Exhibit 1, Addendum 1).
At this meeting Mr. Montague was informed that he would not be able to return to the Bountiful
office, and was provided with four options: (1) resign from employment, (2) be terminated due
to inappropriate conduct and lack of performance, (3) follow the grievance policy of the Church,
-3-

or (4) meet with Gary Winters on Friday, July 17,1998 to discuss his concerns. Mr. Montague
was afforded two weeks leave to think about what he wanted to do. (Id.).
After being provided with the four options mentioned above, Mr. Montague made no
efforts whatsoever to retain his employment with the Church. (& 46-48). Instead, on July 27,
1998 Mr. Montague submitted a letter indicating that he was resigning his employment with the
Church. (Exhibit 16, Addendum 4, R. 47). At no time after his resignation did Mr. Montague
contest or challenge the actions of his employer or the circumstances leading to his resignation.
(R. 27). Mr. Montague accepted new employment at a substantially lower salary, approximately
$2083.00 per month. (Exhibits 3, 5, Addendum 2, 3).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS OF FACT ARE INADEQUATE TO ALLOW FOR
MEANINGFUL REVIEW.
The trial court's findings of fact are conclusoiy and so insufficiently detailed that they

cannot be viewed as legally sufficient. The absence of adequate findings is reversible error and
this Court cannot sustain them as supportive of the conclusions of law or the ultimate ruling.
n.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DETERMINING THAT A
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES OCCURRED WHICH JUSTIFIES
MODIFICATION.
Even if the findings of fact are inadequate, the evidence is uncontroverted that (1) Mr.

Montague had successfully retained employment with the Church for over twenty years, (2) his
own misconduct played a key role in the loss of his employment, (3) he made no attempt to retain
his employment even though presented with opportunity to do so, and (4) he never challenged
his loss of employment as wrongful. In sum, even marshaling all evidence in favor of the trial
-4-

court's ruling, the overwhelming weight of the evidence is such that the trial court abused its
discretion in determining that Mr. Montague was terminated by the Church, that "the degree of
culpability that would need to be attributed to him in connection with the loss of his job, to deny
him the relief he seeks, does not exist", and that a material change in circumstances occurred
justifying modification.
m.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ARTICULATE ITS ANALYSIS IN REDUCING
ALIMONY FROM $600.00 TO $150.00 PER MONTH.
Even if this court were to determine that the trial court did not err in determining that there

occurred a substantial and material change in circumstances justifying modification, the trial court
still did not adequately articulate its decision to reduce alimony to the specific amount of $ 150.00
per month. While testimony and evidence were presented relating to the respective incomes and
expenses of the parties, the court made no findings whatsoever relating to the factors it must
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS OF FACT ARE INSUFFICIENT TO ALLOW FOR
MEANINGFUL REVIEW.
A trial court must make findings on all material issues, and its failure to delineate what

circumstances have changed and why these changes support the modification made in the prior
divorce decree constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear and
uncontroverted and only support the judgment. Muirv. Muir. 841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) (quoting Whitehouse v. Whitehouse. 790 P.2d 57,61 (Utah Ct App. 1990)). The findings
should be more than cursory statements; they must be sufficiently detailed and include enough
-5-

subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached. Id. (quoting Acton v. J.B. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)). The absence of
adequate findings of fact "ordinarily requires remand for more detailed findings by the trial
court." Woodward 823 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
In this case, the trial court concluded that there had occurred a material change in
circumstances and then reduced Mr. Montague's alimony obligation from $600.00 per month to
$150.00 per month. The findings, however, are conclusory almost in their entirety. They are
woefully deficient and cannot be said to adequately support either the conclusions of law or
ultimate ruling.
Firstly, there is no dispute that Mr. Montague's job loss constitutes a change in
circumstances. What is disputed is whether the change in circumstances justifies modification.
See. Bridenbaueh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241 (Utah Ct App, 1990); Paffelv.PaffeL732P.2d
96,103 (Utah 1986): Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156,161 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In order
to determine whether the change in circumstances justifies modification, the voluntariness of Mr.
Montague's cessation of employment with the LDS Church is critical. It would be manifestly
unjust and constitute bad public policy for the trial court to grant Mr. Montague an alimony
reduction if he voluntary left his higher paying job. However, the only findings relating to Mr.
Montague's job loss are:
1. "Mr. Montague lost his job of twenty plus years with the LDS Church."
(Findings of Fact and Order, p. 2); and
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2. "...Mr Montague's actions did have something to do with the fact that he was
terminated ....but he did not intend or want to be terminated from employment. The
degree of culpability that would need to be attributed to him in connection with the loss
of his job, to deny him the relief he seeks, does not exist" (Id.).
The first finding is not helpful because the wording "lost his job" could be applied to
either a voluntary or involuntary cessation of employment. Likewise, the second finding is of no
use because it is conclusory. There are no other detailed findings that give this Court any
guidance in determining how the trial court reached the conclusion that the"degree of culpability"
attributable to Mr. Montague "does not exist" or whether modification was justified as a threshold
matter.
E.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DETERMINING THAT A
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES OCCURRED WHICH JUSTIFIES
MODIFICATION.
The trial court's findings should be overturned only if they are clearly erroneous, and only

where the trial court's judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
Thomas, 987 P.2d 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Remand for adequate findings on a particular
factual issue is unnecessary if the evidence concerning the issue is undisputed. Id.; Levitz v.
Warrington. 877 P.2d 1245 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. Lovegren. 798 P.2d 767 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990). In this case the relevant facts are essentially undisputed. There is no dispute that Mr.
Montague no longer holds his employment with the Church or that he now earns an income
substantially less than that which he earned while employed with the LDS Church. There also
is no dispute that at the July 13,1998 meeting Mr. Montague was presented with four options and
-7-

that he later submitted a letter of resignation. What is at issue is proper application of the facts.
At trial Mr. Montague argued that he resigned because he believed that going through the
grievance procedure would be for naught, and because he was told and believed he would have
lost his retirement benefits if he went through the Church's grievance procedure and lost.
Appellant asserts that Mr. Montague's beliefs are irrelevant - that what is relevant is limited to
Mr. Montague's act of resignation without even attempting to avail himself of the opportunity to
keep his job.
A. CLEAR ERROR AND MANIFEST INJUSTICE.
The trial court's findings should be overturned only if they are clearly erroneous, and only
where the trial court's judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
Thomas. 987 P.2d 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
1. CLEAR ERROR.
In this case the trial court determined that Mr. Montague was terminated by the Church
(R. 129). However, such a determination is clearly erroneous. Rulings in unemployment cases
offer guidance as to whether Mr. Montague initiated the separation or whether it was initiated
by the Church. In Lanier v. Industrial Commission. 694 P.2d 625 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme
Court determined that the burden of proof in unemployment compensation proceedings falls upon
the claimant to establish eligibility for benefits. Such a burden requires that a claimant show he
did not leave work voluntarily, defining "voluntarily" as meaning "at the volition of the employee,
in contrast to a firing or other termination at the behest of the employer." (Id). In Lanier, the
Supreme Court also found relevant the fact, as is the case here, that the claimant "failed to protest
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his termination through hospital grievance procedures with which he was familiar" as
corroborative of an intent to voluntarily leave his employment. In SOS Staffing Services. Inc.,
v. Workforce Appeals Board. 983 P.2d 58L (Utah App 1999V this Court determined that in the
context of an unemployment benefits claim the test for voluntariness in leaving employment is
not the willingness of the employer that the employee continue working, but rather the
willingness of the employee to continue. Thus, under this standard whether the LDS Church
desired the employment relationship to end or continue is irrelevant. "Voluntarily leaving work
means that the employee severed the employment relationship as contrasted to a separation
initiated by the employer. This is true regardless of how compelling the claimant's reasons were
for making the decision to leave the work." (citing Utah Code Admin. P. R994-405-101 (Supp.
1997)).
At trial Mr. Montague argued that at the July 13,1998 meeting he was put into a situation
where he was told either to resign or that he would be terminated. Marshaling the evidence in
favor of the trial court's determination that Mr. Montague was terminated by the Church, the
entire facts contained in the record in support thereof are minimal:
1. Mr. Montague did not want to lose his job with the Church. (R. 62);
2. Mr. Montague submitted a letter of resignation because he was told and
believed that he was not wanted in Church employment any longer. (R. 18, 27-8,45-6);
3. Mr. Montague submitted a letter of resignation because he was told and
believed that if he went through the Church's grievance procedure and lost, he would lose
his vested retirement benefits. (R. 26);
-9-

4. Two of the four options presented to Mr. Montague at the July 13, 1998
meeting were for him to resign or be terminated. (Exhibit 1, Addendum 1).
Appellant can find no other evidence which supports the conclusion that Mr. Montague
was terminated. By contrast, the overwhelming weight of evidence points to the conclusion that
Mr. Montague voluntarily resigned. At the July 13, 1998 meeting, two of the four options
presented to Mr. Montague did not involve separation - following the grievance policy of the
Church, and meeting with Gary Winters on Friday, July 17,1998 to discuss his concerns. (Id.).
After being presented with these options Mr. Montague was given two weeks of leave to think
about his decision (Id.). The decision was placed squarely in Mr. Montague's hands as to what
option he would elect. Mr. Montague then opted to sign a letter of resignation (R. 47, Exhibit 16,
Addendum 4). He also signed an exit interview form wherein he acknowledged he had "decided
to look for new employment." (Exhibit 17, Addendum 5). The Termination Worksheet in Mr.
Montague's personnel file corroborated this action, indicating "resignation during probation"
(Exhibit 19, Addendum 7). Further corroboration of voluntary resignation came from Mr.
Montague's own testimony at trial:
"...J had a decision to make. Could I go on with my life and be
happy or do I want to fight and be contentious and argumentative,
and I'm tired of that. I don't want that anymore. So I made a
decision IfII just go on with my life, get another job where
someone wanted me to work there." (R. 28 (Emphasis added)).
".... I had determined fairly quickly after that [July 13, 1998]
meeting that I was simply going to go on with my life and try to do
something better..." (R. 46).

-10-

Finally, Mr. Montague acknowledged that he gave no thought whatsoever to his alimony
obligation to Ms. Montague in making his decision whether to resign or attempt to keep his
employment. (R. 48-49).
The weight ofthe evidence also renders implausible Mr. Montague's self-serving assertion
that he was told that if he went through the grievance procedure and lost, he would lose his vested
retirement benefits. Firstly, Mr. Montague admitted that despite being given two weeks to make
a decision, he made no investigation to determine the veracity of his claim that he was told if he
went through the grievance procedure and lost that he would lose his vested benefits (R.46).
Further, the grievance policy itself makes no reference to a loss of vested retirement benefits.
(Exhibit 18, Addendum 6). Also, Dean Walker, then employed in the LDS Church's Human
Resources department, and present at the July 13, 1998 meeting, testified that Exhibit 1,
Addendum 1 was an accurate representation of his notes of the July 13,1998 meeting, which also
makes no reference to loss of vested retirement if going through the grievance procedure. (R. 7273). Finally, Ron Garrison, then Director of Human Services for the Welfare Department for the
Church, also present at the July 13,1998 meeting, testified that he did not tell Mr. Montague that
he would lose his retirement benefits if he were to go through the grievance procedure (R. 103).
Mr. Garrison testified that Mr. Montague might even be considered for rehire if he were to apply
(Exhibit 19, Addendum 7, R. 104-105).
Under these facts, it was clear error for the trial court to conclude that Mr. Montague was
"terminated by the church." The trial court's statement that "it was pretty much a foregone
conclusion that [Mr. Montague's] career was over with the Church" is purely speculator/. If the
-11-

Church intended to terminate Mr. Montage it would have done so outright or presented Mr.
Montague with only the first two options. It did not. The fact remains that Mr. Montague was
provided with the opportunity to defend the allegations against him, and to argue a case for
keeping his job. He elected not to do so and did not avail himself of either of the two options
which might have prevented his job loss. It is unknown what would have occurred had he
availed himself of either of those options. Mr. Montague voluntarily resigned and as such is not
entitled to relief. Proctor v. Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "We agree with the
trial court that an able-bodied person who stops working, as an exercise of personal preference
. . . nonetheless retains the ability to earn and the duty to support. . ."
2. FLAGRANT INJUSTICE.
In this case the flagrant injustice flows from the trial court's erroneous determination that
Mr. Montague was terminated by the Church. Mr. Montague's cessation of employment was
voluntary. It is unjust to require Ms. Montague to bear the financial burden of Mr. Montague's
voluntary actions. Mr. Montague was charged with an alimony obligation arising from a twenty
four year marriage wherein he held full time employment with the LDS Church for equal
duration. Then, less than two years after being ordered to pay alimony, he resigned from his
career employment, making no attempt to retain his job even though presented with such
opportunity. It is bad policy to relieve obligors such as Mr. Montague from the ongoing
responsibility of attempting to maintain employment, to the extent possible, at or near his
historical earning capacity, so as to fulfill his court-ordered obligation. Making such a ruling, the
trial court essentially sends the message to obligors that one has no duty to attempt to retain
-12-

higher paying employment, and that quitting one's job is sufficient grounds for alimony reduction
or termination. While Mr. Montague may have not orchestrated or may not have wanted to lose
his job, the undisputed facts remain that he resigned while not availing himself of options which
might have allowed him to retain his employment, and without regard for the financial impact
upon Ms. Montague. Even the scant findings which do exist state that Mr. Montague's own
misconduct had something to do with his loss of employment. Under such circumstances it is
unjust to require Ms. Montague to pay for Mr. Montague's actions, which leaves her in a position
of having to work two jobs to maintain the lifestyle she enjoyed during the twenty four year
marriage, in which she only worked part-time throughout (R. 84), and in which Mr. Montague
clearly could afford to provide support but for resigning from his employment. Exacerbating the
injustice is that after the divorce Ms. Montague paid to Mr. Montague his full share of equity in
the marital residence by borrowing from her parents (R. 89), an obligation to which she is now
responsible. Had Mr. Montague's job loss occurred prior to the same, his failure to pay alimony
could have resulted in an reduction in his equitable lien on the marital residence, in a manner akin
to what this court permitted in Proctor. 773 P.2d 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
B.

INVOLUNTARY JOB LOSS AS A PREREQUISITE TO REVISITING THE
ISSUE OF ALIMONY.

For the reasons stated above, as a threshold matter to revisiting the original alimony award
for review, Mr. Montague first should have been required to bear the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that his cessation of employment was involuntary and the result
of no fault of his own. Williamson v Williamson, 983 P.2d 1103 (Utah Ct. App 1999); citing
Jense v. Jense. 784 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). ("The loss of a job . . . may go to [a
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payor spouse's] ability to pay the judgment, but it is not a proper basis upon which to change the
amount of the original award.")
Ultimately, while distinguishable, this case is most analogous to Hill v. HilL 869 P.2d 963
(Utah Ct. App. 1993), in which this court affirmed the trial court's imputation of income and
finding of voluntary underemployment where the obligor left his employment at Morton Thiokol
and obtained new employment at much lower pay without regard for the financial impact on his
spouse. While the facts are similar, this is a modification proceeding whereas Hill was one
setting an initial award. If this action were a proceeding setting an initial support award, a finding
of voluntary underemployment and income imputation would be warranted under the facts. In
this modification action, however, the trial court simply should have denied the petition as not
justifying modification under the same factual scenario.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO HOLD MR. MONTAGUE TO HIS
BURDEN OF PROOF.

Finally, the record reflects that the trial court did not even hold Mr. Montague to the
proper burden of proof that the change in circumstances justified modification. In making its
ruling, the trial court stated:
"I find that the degree of voluntariness the court thinks is necessary
to disqualify a person for a change of circumstances on the basis it
was voluntary underemployment just were not met here and the
standard that is required for that is not available to [Ms. Montague]
to defeat the claim that was being asserted by Mr. Montague."
The trial court's position directly contravenes Bridenbaugh, Paffel and Maughan. As the party
seeking modification, Mr. Montague should have been charged with the burden of proving that
his job loss was involuntary, and that what occurred justified modification. Instead, the trial court
-14-

improperly charged Ms. Montague with the burden of proving that Mr. Montague's job loss was
voluntary, and that the change did not warrant modification. Thus, in addition to abusing its
discretion by reaching a conclusion in contravention of the weight of the evidence, the trial court
did not even hold Mr. Montague to the proper burden of proof
m.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ARTICULATE ITS ANALYSIS IN REDUCING
ALIMONY FROM $600.00 TO $150.00 PER MONTH.
Even if this court were to determine that the trial court did not err in determining that there

occurred a substantial and material change in circumstances, and that it was proper for the court
to reopen the question of alimony, the trial court still did not adequately articulate its decision to
reduce alimony to the amount of $150.00 per month. Testimony and evidence were presented
as to the respective current incomes and expenses of the parties, but the trial court, while
commencing an analysis as to need and ability to pay, never finished the same and offered no
explanation as to why it was reducing alimony to the specific amount of $150.00 per month.
Utah Code Ann, §30-3-5(7) states in relevant part:
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring
support;
-15-

(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated
by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.
Not only are the scant findings insufficient to justify the award pursuant to case law, the
trial court's setting of a new alimony award without addressing the statutory factors ruling also
renders the ruling unsustainable. Williamson, 983 P.2d 1103 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
CONCLUSION
The trial court's findings of fact are so devoid of specificity that they cannot be sustained
as supportive of the conclusions of law and ruling. The findings offer no insight as to the
analysis, steps or procedure that the trial court utilized in making its ruling. Remand for more
detailed findings therefore is necessary unless this court can determine from the record that the
facts essentially are undisputed. In such case this court could substitute its judgment for that of
the trial court. Ms. Montague asserts that the relevant facts essentially are undisputed as to the
threshold question of whether the change in circumstances warrants modification. The actual
dispute is proper application of those facts to the law, and that the overwhelming weight of the
evidence points to the only logical conclusion that Mr. Montague voluntarily resigned his
employment with the LDS Church. Under such circumstances it was an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to determine that Mr. Montague was terminated by the Church, and
correspondingly that the change in circumstances justified modification. It is patently unjust for
-16-

the trial court to require Ms. Montague to shoulder the burden of Mr. Montague's misconduct and
voluntary decision to seek new employment.
In the alternative, even if there occurred a substantial and material change in
circumstances warranting modification, the trial court nevertheless abused its discretion in
reducing the alimony award to $150.00 per month without making sufficiently detailed findings
as to how it arrived at that specific amount. If modification is justified then remand for more
detailed findings is the only proper action.
DATED this

75

day of

$&p^3rr\bor

, 2000.

RUSSELL Y. MlfrAS
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MICHAEL C MONTAGUE,
Appellee,
Appellate No. 20000155-CA
vs.
MOANA FAIRBANKS MONTAGUE,
Appellant.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this

2+(o day of

S^^r^U*^-

2000,1 deposited in the United

States Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to
the following:
David A. McPhie
Attorney for Appellee
2105 E. Murray-Holladay Road
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
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ADDENDUM
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Tabl

Meeting with Mike Montague
July 13, 1998
Present*

Ron Gamson, Dean Walker, and Mike Montague

Purpose

To discuss Mike Montague's performance in the Bountiful Employment office
since being transferred from the Granger office and being placed on probation
Ron Garrison discussed with Mike the concerns that Sandy Thomas has with his
performance since he has been transferred to Bountiful Ron indicated that things
are not going well and that the LDS Employment Headquarters Staff are
concerned with his performance

Discussion

Ron said that he understood that it was difficult to supervise Jim Fox, but Mike's
performance was below standard in Granger- even to the point where termination
was discussed It was indicated that a decision was made to put him in Bountiful
to give mm an opportunity to continue his employment.
Because of concerns noted by Sandy Thomas, Ron indicated, that Mike would net
be able to return to the Bountiful Emolovment office The following are concerns
that Sandy Thomas outimed
1.

Mike tried to intervene on a concern Sandy had regarding a
contractor to repair lighting in the unit. He questioned the way
Sandv handled the situation This was none of his business

2.

Mike used vulgarity to a parking attendant during a luncheon at the
Olive Garden this past week. This is totally inappropriate

3.

Mike did net agree to the way that Sandy wanted him to work with
an executive He had difficulty in confronting this individual and
redirecting him

4

Since Sue Looney has been cut in the Granger office it is apparent
that the unit is in bad shape It was pointed out to Mike that he had
not managed the office well.

5.

Mike interrupted a phone call that Sandy was having to inform her
that his chair was tipping and that he wanted his old chair back
He had claimed that this was an emergency He did not apologize .

6

The secretary in Bountiful was applying for employment and
needed Mike to look at a letter she had written. He responded and
said that it was not grammatically correct. Sandy proofed it and it

was fine. Mike responded in regard to the secretary leaving"Good, she is stubborn." This inappropriate, since she needed
encouragement not undue criticism.

Conclusion:

7.

Mike made comments to Sandy, "We both need to loose weight."
This was offensive to Sandy Thomas.

8.

On Friday evening Sandy told Mike to have a nice weekend. He
responded by saying, "Okay, don't let the door hit you in the
(made a rude notice) on the way out. Sandy said "Mike!" He said
"well, I didn't say it did I?" The secretary witnessed this
inappropriate remark.

Ron reminded Mike that he had been given a warning letter earlier in the year and
now was on probation due to a lack of performance in the Granger office. Ron
told Mike that the concerns now in Bountiful make if difficult for him to continue
his employment and he would not be able to return to the Bountiful office.
The following options were given to Mike Montague:
1.

Resign from his employment and seek new employment.

2.

Be terminated due to inappropriate conduct and lack of
performance.

3.

Follow the grievance policy of the Church.

4.

Meet with Gar/ Winters on Friday July 17, 1998 to discuss his
concerns.

Ron gave Mike the next two weeks to decide what he is going to do. Mike wiil
use his annual leave instead of having his employment suspended. He will call
Dean Walker to inform him of his decision.
Following the discussion Dean Walker went out to the Bountiful office while
Mike cleaned out his desk. The keys to the facility have been turned in and
returned to Sandy Thomas.
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David A. McPhie (2216)
Attorney at Law
2105 East Murray-Holladay Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
(801)278-3700
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL CHARLES MONTAGUE,

FINANCIAL DECLARATION

Plaintiff.
-vsCivil No. 964900839 DA
MOANA FAIRBANKS MONTAGUE.
nka MO ANA FAIRBANKS.
Defendant.

Plaintiff:

Michael Charles Montague

Address:

2760 South Centerbrook Drive
West Valley City. Utah 84119
529-62-4122

SSN:

Judge William B. Bohling
Commissioner Michael S. Evans

Occupation: Shipping Supervisor
Employer:

Industrial Container & Supply

Birthdate:

10/15/47

NOTE: This declaration must be filed with the domestic calendar clerk 5 days prior to the pretrial hearing. Failure by either party to complete, present, and file this form as required will
authorize the court to accept the statement of the other party as the basis for its decision.
ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALL SUBJECT YOU TO THE
PENALTY FOR PERJURY AND MAY BE CONSIDERED FRAUD UPON THE COURT.

STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES. ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
1.

GROSS MONTHLY INCOME:
Salary/Wages

$2,083.33

Pension/Retirement
Social Security
Disability Insurance
Unemployment Insurance
Public Assistance
Child Support from prior marriage
Dividends/Interest
Rents
Other

$

s

$
$
$
$
$
$

s

TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME:
2.

52,083.33

4-

[^0^

ITEMIZE MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS
FROM GROSS INCOME:
State and Federal Income Taxes

$279.83

Number of Exemptions Taken
Social Security
Medical or Other Insurance
Union or Other Dues
Retirement or Pension Fund
Disability
Savings Plan
Credit Union
Other (specify)

M(l)
$153.34
$79.02
$

TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS:

S512.19

$
$
$
$
$

/ ^ I
3.

NET MONTHLY INCOME

-

51,571.14
j

4.

"

DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS:
Creditor's Name

For

Balance

Monthly Payment

TOTAL:

$

$

5.

ALL PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES KNOWN TO ME OWNED
INDIVIDUALLY OR JOINTLY: (Indicate who holds or how title is held.)

a.

Household furnishings, Furniture,
appliances and equipment:

b.

c.

d.

f.

Owed Thereon

$

$

$

$

$

$

Automobiles (Year, Make):

Securities, Stocks, Bonds:

Cash and Deposit Accounts:
Checking
Savings

e.

Value

$
S

Life Insurance
Name of Company

Policy No.

Face Amount

Cash Value

S

S

Profit Sharing or Retirement Accounts
Name

Value of Interest and amount presently vested

g.

Other Personal Property and Assets (specify)

h.

Real Estate:
Address:
Type of Property:
Date of Acquisition:
Original Cost: $
Cost of Additions:
$
Total Cost:
$
Total Present Value: $
Basis of Valuation:
Mortgage Balance: $
Other Liens: $
Equity:
$
Monthly Amortization:
And to Whom:
Taxes: $
Individual Contributions:

i.

Business Interest (indicate name, share, type of business, value less indebtedness):

j.

Other Assets (specify):

6.

TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES: *(Specify which partv is the custodial parent and
list name and relationship of all members of the household whose expenses are
included,)

* Self, Jeri (wife) Hyrum (son)
Rent or Mortgage Payments
SSS^.OO
Real Property Taxes
S
Real Property Insurance
S
S25.Q0
Maintenance
Food and Household Supplies
{' S250.0fy f/zy fa „ <-/£
Utilities (Water, electricity, gas and heat) ^SSfrffi^
Telephone
(SJOQQj
Laundry and Cleaning
$5.00
Clothing
I
Medical
flOO.OO)— PA uMJ^
Dental
1
Insurance (life, accident, disability, etc)
SI00.00 (Auto)
(Exclude payroll deducted)
Child Care
^J£—Z^x
Payment of Child/Spousal Support
(
S60(X00N )
(RE: Prior Marriage)
~
-^
School
Entertainment (Clubs, social obligations,
travel, recreation, etc.)
S25.00
Incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol,
<rr*j>U n <-lr*i*k.
gifts and donations)
^250.00j
Transportation (other than automobile)
Auto Expense (gas, oil, repair, insurance) S75.00
Auto Payments
Installment Payment(s)
Other Expenses
S
Condo Association Fee ^r^P"\
SIO&QQ--^
. 7 , ,*,,/,
Attorney's Fees
7'$^
S550.00' < ^ K < * w r r * ^ .
*<""' "
p
Storage Fees
$69.00
TOTAL EXPENSES

52,928-00

tO

l

-Lrb o

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

I swear that the matters stated herein are true and correct.
DATED this °r^ day of J l d ^ U -

, 1999.

/wJLJL(!7/Uf^Sl
Michael C. Montague

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

Mv Commission Expires:
r\ n xA M / v .
W M If. \L\°\M

'au(J

/ ' day of \ I I / 1 1 M ^

NOTARYJKlBLIC, in and for
Salt Lake County, Utah

J
SAWf I HUTCHINGS |
2106 & Murray Noladay M i
Sat L*» dry, Utah 8iU7
My Cofnmiwion Expire. *
JuV 10, 1990
J

D:\WP6l\CLIENTS\MONTAGUE\3-FD PET

1999.

0

Tab 3

f iiw\vi*l bdUrxtim (tynffMisofi
MICHAEL MONTAGUE
Income
SEPT. 1996

JUL. 1999

Income

$3726.00

$2083.33

Net income

$2422.13

$1571.14

Expenses
Rent/Mortgage

$250.00

Maintenance
Food & household supplies

$584.00
$25.00

$250.00

$250.00

Utilities

$80.00

Telephone

$90.00

Laundry & cleaning

$5.00

Clothing

$100.00

$25.00

Medical

$100.00

$100.00

Auto insurance

$100.00

Child/Spousal support

$735.00

$600.00

Entertainment

$150.00

$25.00

Incidentals

$425.00 (incl. tithing)

$250.00

Auto expenses

$150.00

$75.00

Auto payments

$335.00

Installment payments

$100.00

Condo association fees

$100.00

Attorney's fees

$550.00

Storage fees

$69.00

TOTAL(EXPENSES)

D:\WP6 l\CLIENTS\MONTAGUE\SCOMPAiUSON

$2595.00

$2928.00
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w

Monday, July 27, 1998

To Whom It May Concern,
On this day, Monday, August 3, 1998,1 do hereby resign my employment with
the Employment Resource Services Department of The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints.

Tab 5

TH£

0F

CHURCHOF

JESUS CHRIST
LATTER-DAY
SAINTS

Exit Inte. .<ew Questionnaire
Date

Personnel Department

Confidential

I Name

Thank
wm i for
fnr filling
fillinn out
m jf the
fhp following
f n l l n w i n n survey
si irvpv Your
Ym ir candid
r a n H i H feedback
fpoHha^u- ie
i m m r t ' i n f ^to Wo
Thank you
is important
us
Your responses will be reviewed by a member of management who is at least one level aoove your
super/isor Please complete the following items and circle the appropriate number on the scale
Acd written comments below (use the back of this sheet if necessary)
Pl
ease return the completed form to your personnel director/coordinator

rms information will ce "eviewed by the .nterviewer before your exit interview, which will be conducted as follows
Name ct mrerviewer

1 My reason 'or 'eavmg (use ;he bacK or this sheet if necessary;

*2>ec/6t.c/ Vc foc^

-A'1. /V2^' ^ / ^ ^ y ^ w

Questionnaire

<
2 My supervisor and 1 regularly reviewed my progress toward estaolisned goals and
reset them wnen appropriate
3 I saw a strong link between my performance and my pay.
4 i was well trained by the Church to do my job
5 l felt that my JOO contnbutec to (he missions of the Church
6 Vly achievements were recognized
" My ceoartment management Kept me advised of my career patn opocrtunities
3 I was fairly compensated for my experience skills and 'evel or responsibility
9 I was satisfied with the Churcn Senem plans
G There was a sense of teamwork in my work group
i My superyisor understood the work I did
2 My superyisor was fair and consistent m his/her behavior with subordinates
3 I feit that I was treated like a valued employee
Comments <w,se rHe Oack a Tiis sneer r necessary)
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jOU>U1KM
0F

LATTER-DAY

SAINTS

5*U«|««

Em

P f OY*e Treatment

Date ot orgm

Caie ol revision

March 1, 1955

I January 20, 7998

(f*rc—

PHILOSOPHY
The Church seeks to create a work environment that encourages effective
communication and working relationships between employees and management.

POLICY
There is an orderly, approved procedure that allows employees to discuss
work-related concerns through proper management channels.
PROCEDURE
Step.

The employee should try to resolve work-related concerns with the
immediate supervisor. The deoartment's Human Resource
representative is available to assist if the supervisor or employee so
desires. Employees who fee! that their immediate supervisor is part
of the concern may go directly to the second level supervisor.

Step 2

If the concern is not resolved ?n step 1, the employes may request a
review of the concern with the highest non-General Authority level of
management in the department, (in tne case of field employees, Area
Presidencies or temple presidents will normally become directly
invoivec in the review process as a Dart of step 4.) The review
discussion can be held with or without the presence of other
department supervisors. The department's Human Resource
representative or a senior administrator of the Human Resource
Department may be invited to be present during the discussions with
the employee.

Steo 3

If the concern ?s not resolved in step 2, the employee may raqusst a
review of the concern with the managing director of the Human
Resource Department. This review c^n be held wrth or without the
presence of a supervisor from the employee's department. The
department's Human Resource representative may be present during
appropriate discussions.

2»rt 2/5? •—raCr-jSA

Vwl l U f W w f !Uf-

JESUS CHRIST
°

C

LATTTR"DAV

SAINTS

/

0>'C,

^ ^ p i o y e e Treatment
Qatft or o*"gin

March 1, 1985

Steo 4

0

^
Owe of revision

January 20, 1993

[f the concern is not resolved in step 3, the employee may request a
review of the concern bv the Generaf Authority(ies) responsible for the
employee's department. Before any meetings are set, the managing
director of the Human Resource Department w»lf explain the situation
in detail to the General Authority, W^ere an Area Presidency or a
temole president, and a headquarters Genera! Authority ar* both
involved in the management of a function, both should be involved in
the review process. The final response will be made by the
headquarters General Authority responsible for the employee's
department. He may or may not meet vvith the concerned employee.

After each step of the appeal process the appropriate level of management should
gtve the employee a written response advising the employee of the decision.
The department Human Resource representative may be askea ro provide counsel or
he!p in resolving the concern at any time during tne review process.

220<a 3i3Z ^ e d ^ oS*

Tab 7

'Person Initiating Action:

Date:

Name:

. 7 - a T.75*-

Telephone Numberf-^ *
Employee Io/bmudoo:

COSZ/2

EMPLOYEE NAME:

gc^

Position Number (FTE):
Last Work Day:

f-y'&S*-

£**/

<=>

^"-3-^(T

Voluntary
Reason for Termination:

S

Unif__

6r^

^ s

&-?/•}«*£&&&&

OTE-

Termination code:*
Involuntary

KVs'>»«-/'o-^

^>L'H>^',

'*t-aQ/frsa-*!

•

Rehire:
Yes

-i

1 !
No

Review_

Exit Interview Conducted:
Yes

;XNO

Exit Interview Questionnaire Completed:
Yes , / No

^^<C
^SeniQr Humap)Resource Representative

<

^MSN
OTET
PAR
PAY
POL
REF
RTF
RTR
SLA
SUP
TAF
TMP
ENS
WOR

Mission Service
Resigning for Other EmpOorer
Parenting:
Dissatisfied with Pay
Dissatisfied wtifc Policies
Refused Transfer
Redaction in Force
Retirement
Spouse Leaving Ares
Dissatisfied vrith Supervisor
Transfer to Affiliate
End Temporary Employment
Uasatisfixctoiy Work
Dissatisfied with Working

'1
J

%

3
r 1

"\
*
j

i
i
4

1
3

%
3
3
1

4
1
1

i

i
t

i
3
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JESUS CHRIST
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS

WELFAPE SERVICES
Seventh Floor

50 East North Temple Street

26 June 1998

Salt Lake Cty, Utah 34150

Michael Montague
LDS Employment Sen/ices
3648 South 7200 West
Magna, UT 84044
Dear Mike:
This letter is to notify you that you are being demoted from Supervisor- Employment Office
to the position of Employment Specialist and you are being placed on probation, because of
unsatisfactory work performance.
Specific areas of concern include:
1.
Failure to appropriately supervise staff Supervision requires that the manager
motivate staff and work with them to meet productivity standards and minimum job requirements.
Such supervision requires that goals, expectations and work assignments are communicated
adequately. These were not adequately communicated.
2.
Failure to follow instructions from voursupervisor In a meeting held with Jim Holm
and myself on May 20, you were instructed to hold regular weekly meetings with your staff to
review goals, expectations, and work assignments for the coming week. You failed to hold these
meetings as instructed.
3.
Failure to address the challenees that existed between vou and vour emciovment
specialist. In this same meeting you were instructed to work closely with the employment specialist
to help resolve issues that caused him anxiety and physical illness. You avoided addressing the
issues, causing the employment specialist further anxiety.
In order to remain in your new position, it is expected that you will:
1.
Meet service plan kev indicator performance expectations Your new supervisor,
Saudi Thomas, will establish with you specific performance expectations regarding the number of
job ready, job preparation and job creation placements you should accomplish, to help the center
achieve its service plan.
2.
Follow instructions eiven to vou b v vour new supervisor. Your supervisor will give
you instructions to perform duties apart from the key indicators, in areas such as ecclesiastical

training, interagency coordination, and volunteer supervision. You will be expected to follow these
instructions.
3.
Meet regularly with vour supervisor to review performance. Your supervisor will
establish a schedule of regular meetings in which she will review your performance against key
indicators and this probationary plan.
Effective today, you are on probation for up to ninety (90) calendar days. Failure to comply
with the terms of this probation, both during and after the probationary period, will result in
termination of your employment. Your performance rating has been reduced to 4.0.
If you have questions regarding this letter, or what changes are expected of you, please visit
with meor your supervisor, Sandi Thomas, to receive clarification. Sister Thomas and I are desirous
to see corrections made that will enable you to become the employee you desire to be and to prevent
further disciplinary action from occurring.
I have read and understood this letter of probation.

Tab 9

27.
NOTES OF CONVERSATION WITH MIKE MONTAGUE
June 26,1998

Jun Holm, Dean Walker and I (Bennie Lilly) met with Mike Montague in my office. After
greetings and a brief prayer, I reviewed with Mike the letter (attached) which was prepared
announcing his demotion from Supervisor-Employment Office to Employment Specialist. It also
contains the provisions of his probation.
Wliile he was obviously not pleased, he did not deny any of the allegations. He did apologize for
putting us in the position where we had to take these steps He felt disappomted that we had to "
come up with" these areas of concerns in order to bring about the demotion.
I indicated that he would be asked to tram the new employment specialist, Sue Looney, on
Monday, June 29, and Tuesday, June 30. Then he would be asked to report to the Bountiful
Center on Wednesday, July 1, with Sandi Thomas as his new manager She would meet with
him and prepare a performance plan with specific goals, and then report to me on his progress
We all indicated our desire for him to succeed in his new assignment. We consider him a
valuable employee, lacking managerial skills, but with well developed skills in helpmg job
seekers one on one If he lacked such skills, we might not be offenng this opportumty for him to
continue employment. He indicated that he felt he could make Sandi "look good" with his
performance.
I also indicated to him that in his new position, he would be working with a member of the
opposite sex, a different association for him than that of the past several years It would be
important for him to conduct himself in a professional manner, remembering the special
sensitivities and courtesies that need to be shown to any member of the opposite sex. For
example, he would not be able to nde in a car alone with Sandi. I indicated that I had been in a
similar situation working with a female (Julie Poole) as the only two employees in a center
myseif in the past. He would need to adjust to this new arrangement.
Mike was then asked to sign the letter as an mdication that he had read and understood it. Jim
and I also signed the letter as witnesses. Jim and Dean were given the opportumty to share any
additional comments, which were limited to expressions of hope for success Mike was given
the chance to ask any additional questions, which he did not, and the meeting ended with him
departing, shaking hands with each of us.

